A TRAIN THAT CAN'T BE STOPPED

(Article by Amira Hess, "Ha'aretz", July 18, 1995, p.B2)
One of the recent rumors in Gaza maintains that, about ten days ago, a group from Iz a-Din al-Kassam managed to outsmart the bodyguards of Muhammad Dahlan, head of the Palestinian preventive security in the Gaza Strip. According to the rumor, they succeeded in shooting their rifles close to Dahlan's home, with his bodyguards immediately giving chase. Then, the rumor goes, a second group took advantage of the absence of the security guards, entering the house and surprising Dahlan telling him: "You see, we can get to you."
Contrary to other rumors surrounding the activities of HAMAS' military wing, this one was not supported by a leaflet detailing the incident. Nor did it apparently reach circles further away from HAMAS. Dahlan's aides reacted with blatant disregard and completely rejected the story.
In the governing style in which the net filtering information to the local press is becoming increasingly tight, journalists have little motivation to investigate further but as usual, and without any connection to the factual truth, the rumor (as it evolves) has assumed its own internal logic which has fed events, and is likely to assist in shaping reality.
This rumor was disseminated in the Gaza Strip at a time when the public activity, and even prestige, of Gaza's largest opposition group appeared to be at a low ebb unparalleled within the last seven years. A number of senior organization members have been detained for three weeks, and other members have been detained for longer periods. The story of the humiliation endured by detainees the shaving of their hair and beards was leaked outside the prison's walls and shocked many, not just within HAMAS. The stated reason for the arrest of the HAMAS political activists changes occasionally. After two months during which the military branches of the Islamic opposition movements refrained from attacks, a suicide bomber's cart exploded in Gush Katif in late-June, although without causing damage to the IDF jeep passing nearby. The suicide attacker was a HAMAS member, and a leaflet was circulated in Khan Yunis stating that Iz a-Din al-Kassam had accepted responsibility and linking the explosion to the assassination of an Islamic Jihad member in Shati four days earlier. A few hours later, another leaflet contained a denial of the claim that this had been a "movement-sanctioned operation" from on-high.
The arrests and treatment of detainees has not brought HAMAS members into the streets; the movement has made so with a leaflet that was particularly critical of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Outside the ranks of HAMAS, this has been interpreted as evidence of structural weakness within the organization, which is collapsing under the weight of the PA's tactic of imposing capitulation. There are those who have even asserted that HAMAS is quickly following in the footsteps of other political groups, and is also engaged in a process of disintegration under the pressure of Arafat's policy of centralization and his dictates of exclusivity.
On the surface, it would appear that the Dahlan "ambush" story aims to breathe encouragement into the ranks of HAMAS members and sympathizers, and to prove that the military option still exists. Absurdly, this rumor might give more ammunition to the PA, which has stated that all its actions against HAMAS are designed to prevent the creation of a "dual" security regime a sure formula for civil war and not to silence political criticism.
Only behind closed doors will people (on both sides) say that this exaggeration of the opposition's military strength serves other needs. For HAMAS, the military halo has always been and, they hope, will continue to be a political attraction. For the PA, on the other hand, the military danger ascribed to the opposition and which requires an appropriate response is helpful in proving, to both Israel and the United States, the seriousness of its intention to implement the peace process.
In recent days, partially substantiated rumors of an agreement taking shape between the PA, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad to include a guarantee to "hold fire" within the Autonomous areas have also subsided. Not surprisingly, the hints, which lasted for about two months, in the wake of the Kfar Darom attacks, implying that such an agreement was about to be reached came from the direction of the PA. HAMAS and Islamic Jihad emphatically proclaimed that the decision to "hold fire" was an internal one in other words, a pause that might only be temporary, depending on circumstances. These rumors of an impending agreement served the PA as proof of its ability to rule also through dialogue and persuasion. The promised accord, in whose glory the PA basked, was the flip-side of the "mass arrests" coin.
The efforts to persuade the parties to reach an agreement were not only made in covert and semi-covert talks, but mainly through "mediators" a number of HAMAS members who, in recent months, have tended toward freezing their public activities within the movement, because they voluntarily adhered to a more moderate and compromising line concerning the PA. This lobbying, according to a number of witnesses, also took place in interrogation rooms. The more political and mature interrogators are apparently trying also to speak to the detainees' political sense. One interrogator, obviously a Fatah member who sat in an Israeli jail for many years, told his friend and neighbor from the refugee camp "I tell them: This is a train that can't be stopped. The United States and Israel are the engineers, and do you actually think that you can stop them?"
It seems that the PA now feels strong enough to manage without "written agreements." On the other hand, after various delays, the PA finally granted a license (about one week ago) to the Islamic University which sought permission to begin construction on permanent quarters, in place of the pre-fabricated buildings in which its classes have been held. This comes in stark contrast to the situation at Al-Azhar University, where Fatah dominates the scene.
The PA would not have succeeded in its tactics of surrender thus far, were the thirst for normalcy not such a prominent characteristic of current life in Gaza. Not only do orthodox religious restrictions no longer apply to men and women who together pack Gaza's public entertainment facilities. Even national symbols and ceremonies now have less of an attraction. Even if the much heralded economic recovery is enjoyed only by a very narrow stratum, and if most of the population remains engrossed in the search for income to provide for their most basic needs the desire to have fun, to relax after seven years of voluntary asceticism, and to laugh is stronger than all critical analyses of reality.
Because of this thirst, it was very easy for the PA to pin responsibility for the closure and the economic deterioration on HAMAS and Islamic Jihad although supporters and opponents of the process basically agree that the Israeli closure policy was calculated and strategic (as negotiating pressure), and even though the attacks are primarily a comfortable excuse to implement the policy.
To an external observer, it would appear that HAMAS has reacted to the PA's actions with silence and by retreating within itself. "I am a long-standing HAMAS member, and I never knew so little about what is happening within the movement and its leadership," someone confessed. Another said that this is not indicative of weakness, but of a conscious decision not to be dragged into a civil war. Another member stated that this decision to effectively "go underground" is actually the proven recipe for a process of radicalization among the rank and file, and for the return of more rigid (in their positions) spokesmen to the stage. One result of the recent arrests has been the departure of HAMAS representatives from the multi-faction committee, which was created to organize the activities expressing solidarity with the striking security prisoners in Israeli jails. Their participation in this forum was actually considered a pseudo-brake for the effects of various social shocks, offering an avenue for dialogue.
Over three weeks ago, even before HAMAS bolted the committee, all the movements held a joint gathering in support of the prisoners. To the great sorrow of the organizers, HAMAS supporters represented a majority of those in the stadium and in contravention of agreements reached in advance they shouted "sectarian" slogans in favor of Iz a-Din al-Kassam. They didn't even heed the pleas of Ismail Haniyeh, one of the most prominent moderates within HAMAS. "This has never happened before," one astonished member said, "that people did not comply with the request of one of the leaders."
An obvious consequence of the measures taken against the Islamic opposition is the increasing gap between its supporters and all others. Even the thirst for normalcy and the aversion to, and fear of, voicing criticism have developed into embarrassing indifference and estrangement toward what has become a regular experience for the religious-opposition public: repeated detentions, under difficult and frustrating conditions, in Palestinian prisons. ("This is not the time to talk," one Palestinian attorney said.) And all of a sudden, traditional hostilities between Fatah (mainly the left-wing movements) and HAMAS have been resurrected. Earlier charges, according to which the successors of the Muslim Brotherhood aspire to bring about the retreat of Palestinian society, are again being raised forcefully after years in which the joint struggle against occupation kept them under wraps.
One of the Muslim clerics arrested ten days ago had not actually criticized the Palestinian Authority; rather, he confined his remarks to undesirable social phenomena. The interrogators of the security branch which arrested him explained to those who asked: "But, after all, he preached in favor of wearing veils." Those detaining him apparently understand that people who have, for years, suffered because of (and surrendered to) HAMAS' measures of orthodox coercion primarily directed against women will not extend themselves to defend the democratic rights of preachers who use their Friday appearances to call for women to keep their heads covered.