TERRORISM, PROFIT, AND LOSS

(Article by Dan Shiftan, "Davar", July 28, 1995, p. 8)
THE MIDDLE EAST IN GENERAL, AND PALESTINIAN HISTORY IN PARTICULAR, ARE CHARACTERIZED BY AN ESPECIALLY HIGH LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE. ONLY IF IT BECOMES CLEAR TO THE PALESTINIANS THAT A VIOLENT STRUGGLE IS TOO COSTLY FOR THEM, IS THERE ANY CHANCE THAT THIS VIOLENCE WILL NOT CONTINUE TO CHARACTERIZE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IN THE FUTURE AS WELL.
Terrorism is a political tool. Like any other political tool, there is only one important question; when one element decides to use it, and another element decide to fight it. The question is: is it worthwhile? Does it serve the political goal for which it was taken out of the arsenal? Is the cost of the tool greater than its political benefit? Israel's task is to prove to Arafat that terrorism does not pay. In the circumstances that have been created after Oslo, this is no easy mission.
The Palestinian national movement has been characterized by the use of political violence since it was founded, in the early 1920's. This movement was conceived and born in the struggle with Israel, which entailed violence and terrorism, and its history has been characterized by their high-profile use as political tools. In the immediate and short range, these means have justified their use. Israel's challenge is to compel the PLO to recognize that in the medium- and long-range, no gain will accrue to their use.
During the British administration, the Palestinian collective had recourse to riots, terrorism, and revolt, because it was only through their use that the Palestinians were able to damage the Jewish National Home and the threat that it posed to their claim to ownership of the entire country. The British wanted calm. They did not want to invest resources in the struggle against the uprising, and were afraid of severe political results, if the masses of Arabs and Muslims throughout the empire identified with their brothers in Palestine. The Zionist element had an interest in pretending that it could reach an understanding with the central stream of the Arab public, in order to convince the British that they did not need to choose between the handful of Jews and the Arab masses. The Jews understood that if the British ever found it necessary to choose between the two, they would choose the Arabs, at the expense of the Jews and their national aspirations.
The Palestinians had an interest in imposing the choice on the British, since they as the then masters of the country would then prosper through the preference given to the general Arab-Muslim interest. Political violence was a very effective means in the 1920's and 1930's, and helped to force the British to adopt anti-Zionist policies on the eve of World War II. During the late 1940's as well, this violence helped along with the mobilization of the Arab countries to use their own violent measures the Palestinian struggle against the emerging Jewish state. These almost defeated the Jewish community on the eve of the invasion, and during its first stages. In fact, these policies decisively contributed to the Palestinians' national tragedy, and to the loss of the country that they saw as their homeland; but the alternative of a compromise with Zionism was seen by a majority in those days, as ideologically and politically impossible, and also unnecessary in terms of the balance of forces.
When the Palestinian national movement re-emerged, in the mid-1960's, the "armed struggle" was put at the heart of its political outlook. Ideologically, this struggle was supposed to decide the war ("it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase"; Palestinian National Charter, Article 9), but in practice, the PLO leaders well knew that this was a helpful means, not the main effort. After the defeat of 1967, it was clear that the Palestinians themselves had no chance of defeating Israel by force of arms; even as a catalyst for a comprehensive confrontation with the Arab countries, only limited hopes could be pinned on the armed struggle. The importance of this struggle in general, and the use of terrorism in particular, was in three other spheres: the internal Palestinian, the inter-Arab, and the international.
In the internal Palestinian sphere, the PLO leadership had to present a perspective of hope during the years of struggle with Israel, and satisfaction of the feelings of its people, and had to present itself as leading the public on this path. For the leadership which sprang up outside the main concentrations of the people it claimed to represent, having a political hold over the Palestinians themselves was a top priority. In the atmosphere of utter defeat after the setback, they needed to prove that it was possible to do something to attack the Jews, that the Palestinians themselves could make a decisive contribution, and that the PLO was the leading element in this effort.
In the inter-Arab sphere, the PLO used the armed struggle in order to loosen the complete guardianship which had been placed over the Palestinian issue, and over the buds of the Palestinian national movement since the 1940's. Until the Six Day War, Nasser and his supporters claimed that the regular armies would defeat Israel. After the defeat, the PLO succeeded in convincing many in the pan-Arab public at large, that the Palestinians were the only ones who were continuing to fight unconditionally, to attack the Jews and Israel, and to sacrifice themselves on behalf of the vision of "liberating Palestine." In light of this struggle, the PLO demanded and even, to some extent, gradually succeeded to provide itself with immunity against being physically and politically eliminated, and in establishing its position as an element, without which the "question of Palestine" could not be decided. In the mid-1970's, it succeeded in institutionalizing the new position that it had acquired for itself as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," at the expense of its rivals and those who sought to eliminate it in the Arab world.
In the international sphere, the PLO succeeded in instilling the awareness of its struggle with Israel, and its national claims, into the consciousness of western public opinion. The terrorist actions themselves were condemned, but their negative effect in this consciousness gradually wore off, as the positive effect of the political message that a people without a homeland was being pushed into taking desperate measures, after legitimate means for it were blocked gained ground. Against the background of the violent struggle, and despite terrorism's ugly displays, the demand for a national settlement to the Palestinian problem as distinct from dealing with the humanitarian dimension only, which had characterized the prevailing approach until about 20 years ago took root.
The main price of the achievements of terrorism and the armed struggle, found expression in the struggle for Israeli public opinion. Palestinian terrorism greatly contributed to convincing the mainstream Israeli public that the struggle with the PLO was an existential one, and that it could not be allowed to become established in its own state. Israeli governments which opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state under the PLO's control for both direct and indirect reasons succeeded in mobilizing a very broad national agreement against such a settlement, which was based, in part, on the trauma of Palestinian terrorism, and drew on the violent manifestations which had characterized the Palestinian national movement since its inception.
What moderated the damage to the Palestinians in this sphere, was the restrictions which the Palestinians had placed upon themselves during the intifada. The attempt to avoid terrorism in most of its stages, enabled Israel to consider in a more open way the political message that the Palestinians were sending in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Arafat and his organization were still to a large measure seen as terrorists, but their supporters in the territories were perceived, in the eyes of many, as negotiating partners with whom it was possible to compromise. In his weakness, even Arafat understood that his identification with terrorism was damaging both his position and his chances, and he chose to dissociate himself from it.
In this sphere as well, an new era was opened in Oslo, which has consequences for the role of the armed struggle and terrorism in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The picture is complex, and the forecast is not clear, because it is possible to distinguish at least two trends. The first is encouraging a distancing from terrorism and to a certain degree a struggle by the Palestinian Authority against those who practice it. The second, is giving post facto legitimacy to violence, and even to past terrorism, and is liable to strengthen the motivation to use them in the future.
The first trend is recognized, and is even being currently demonstrated: Arafat already unequivocally promised to refrain from terrorism, at the beginning of the Oslo process. His organization Fatah is practically not using terrorism, and Arafat is, apparently, doing everything so that it does not take part in it at this stage. After he understood the damage that his countenancing of the terrorism of other Palestinians was causing to his accomplishments in the negotiations with Israel, he even began a limited attempt to make things difficult for those initiating it.
The second trend is not winning the full attention that it deserves. If those carrying on the violent struggle, and even acts of terrorism, are released en masse from prison, and some of them are integrated into the Palestinian Authority's armed forces, it is possible to understand this as a post facto legitimizing of their actions, as a legitimate national struggle. There is a political message in the fact that one of those who was involved in the Munich terrorist attack (Amin Al-Hindi), is no longer being pursued by Israel's agents, but is being received as a partner in the discussions with Israel on the measures necessary for protecting its citizens. The political message of using the Jews' tiredness of dealing with terrorism and bloodshed to justify the need to establish a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is liable to lead to a conclusion being drawn regarding the efficacy of terrorism as a tool in persuading Israel to change its positions in the past, and on the motivation to use the same tool in areas where it is still not prepared to change its positions (for example, on the issue of Jerusalem).
The Middle East in general, and the history of the Palestinians in particular, are characterized by an especially high level of political violence directed both within Arab society and outwardly alike. Only if it becomes unequivocally and continuously clear to the Palestinians that a violent struggle is too costly for them, is there any chance that this violence will not continue to characterize their relationship with Israel in the future as well.